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The Aporia of the Other in Curriculum Construction: 
A Response to Anna Strhan 
NOBUHIKO ITANI 
Graduate School of Education, Kyoto University 
Strhan examines two models of religious education that have been most 
prominent recently in Britain. She attempts to show some limitations in these two 
models and to investigate the possibility of an alternative approach to religious 
education. Strhan has pointed out very important issues not only related to 
religious education, but also to secular education, in the degree to which the 
problem of 'the Other' is to be taken into consideration in the whole field of 
education. Indeed, as she pointed out, it is inadequate for religious education to 
address religious issues merely as a matter of knowledge, as long as it is 
connected closely with the problem of the Other, i.e., the opacity and the 
otherness of religious traditions. Nevertheless, I have some questions on two 
different levels: how is it possible to plan engagements with those of different 
religious traditions as a valuable opportunity without spoiling the opacity and 
illeity of the Other, and how would it be possible for Strhan to convince her 
colleagues to follow her suggestions about religious education? 
SUMMARY OF STRHAN'S PRESENTATION 
Anna Strhan examines two models of religious education that have been most 
prominent recently in Britain: the phenomenological model and the critical realist 
model, the latter of which she describes as particularly popular in Britain today. She 
attempts to show some limitations in these two models and to investigate the 
possibility of an alternative approach to religious education, referring to the way that 
religion is theorised in the works of Emmanuel Levinas and Slavoj Zizek. She 
identifies the aims of religious education that have been set by these two models as 
especially problematic. On the one hand, the aims of religious education in the 
phenomenological model are represented by such concepts as 'tolerance of 
difference' and 'empathy in interfaith dialogue' that have been demanded through 
diversification of religion in modem society. On the other hand, the critical realist 
model of religious education emphasizes the importance of students' ability to 
evaluate for themselves 'what constitutes ultimate truth' through rational arguments 
in religious and ethical fields. Each model is similarly motivated by 'a desire to avoid 
the religious indoctrination of students', as had been the case with the subtle 
indoctrination of Christianity in prior models of religious education (Strhan, 2009). 
Although the concepts of religious education in these two models differ greatly, 
Strhan draws attention to ideas shared between them that demonstrate the limitations 
of present forms of religious education in Britain. Although she accepts that tolerance 
and empathy are 'desirable aims for religious education' and that evaluation of the 
truth claims of the different religions is 'useful', she Sees both models of religious 
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education as taking 'transparency of religion' for granted in a problematic way, 
'either in terms of religious belief or in terms of [religious] lifeworlds'. The 
phenomenological model of religious education tends to encourage students, through 
the concept of 'empathetic experience', to understand different religious traditions by 
bringing their 'otherness' within the spheres of their own understanding. The critical 
realist model, on the other hand, is designed to enable students to see 'religious and 
ethical truths as matters open to straightforward evaluation and justification'. The 
problem she highlights is that current religious education tends to assess students 
solely in terms of their ability to 'select and demonstrate clearly (their) knowledge 
and understanding' and to 'evaluate and justify a perspective'. Thus, 'the true 
complexity of the nature of religious belief and practice', which is founded on what is 
beyond articulation and rational justification, is largely ignored. 
Against this tendency in recent religious education, Strhan suggests an alternative 
approach to religious education based on the writings of Levinas and Zizek. She 
asserts that religion is 'founded on an ethical sensibility that is irreducible to 
knowledge'. According to her interpretation, 'religion ultimately, for Levinas, is to 
respond to the need of my neighbour who approaches me, yet remains ultimately 
unknowable in illeity'. Illeity is, as Strhan explains, 'the refusal of reciprocity and 
totalization'. It means that 'slipping into a relation of equality is impossible'. She 
describes that in this sense, the notion of religion in Levinas 'is ethical at its core and 
as such cannot be reduced to knowledge'. She continues, explaining that Zizek also 
emphasizes that religious belief is 'an ethics that cannot be reduced to or justified in 
terms of knowledge'. If these contentions are right, the prominent models of religious 
education, as represented by such concepts as 'tolerance,' 'empathy', 'evaluation', 
'justification', 'transparency', and 'knowledge,' must be improved at least to some 
extent. The importance, however, of knowledge related to the study of different 
religions should not be disregarded, or even decreased. 
Finally, Strhan concludes her paper by questioning what religious education today 
should be. Strhan repeats her emphasis on 'the opacity' and 'the otherness' of religion 
itself, referring to the complexity of the nature of the religious belief and tradition. 
She argues that religious education cannot be reduced either to teaching students the 
importance of tolerance of differences and empathetic understanding of different 
religious traditions, or to encouraging students to criticize and evaluate the truth 
claims of different religious traditions. Strhan cites the recent OFSTED report on 
religious education in Britain, which indicates the importance of 'creating 
opportunities for children and young people to meet those with different viewpoints' , 
and suggests that religious education 'should engage pupils' feelings and emotions, as 
well as their intellect'. Strhan says that an 'understanding of religion as founded on an 
ethical sensibility that is irreducible to knowledge . . . provides a conceptual 
framework to support the recommendations of the OFSTED report'. At this point, we 
can glimpse what the improved model of religious education proposed by Strhan 
might involve. 
A brief example that demonstrates aspects of Strhan's own practice in her school 
presents a more concrete picture of what she regards as a desirable model of religious 
education. She and her students invited 'a number of girls from Muslim school in East 
London to spend the day with students at her school studying Religious· Studies'. This 
invitation program· had clear aims: Strhan hoped that her students and guests would 
use the opportunity to 'compare their experiences of studying religion' and 'discuss 
the different ways in which religion impacts on their own experiences of being 
teenagers in London'. She finds that this program provided 'a valuable opportunity to 
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meet and engage with those from a very different background', and especially for her 
students who are from secular households, 'an invaluable insight into what it might be 
like to live as a teenager whose religious identity is very important to them'. Strhan 
suggests that 'the true complexity of the social reality of religion is something that 
must be prioritized within religious education, in a way that is not supported by the 
current framework'. Apparently, the invitation program described above is an 
example of the new approach that Strhan would like to introduce into religious 
education in Britain, even though she does not refer to this point directly in the 
presentation. 
QUESTIONS ON TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS 
Strhan has pointed out very important issues not only related to religious education, 
but also to secular education, in the degree to which the problem of 'the Other' is to 
be taken into consideration in the whole field of education. A pupil can appear to her 
teacher as the Other who solicits a response yet refuses any empathetic and rational 
understanding, and vice versa. Moreover, plants, animals, landscapes, or mere 
inanimate objects (a wall clock, a celestial globe, blots on the ceiling) can appear to 
children sometimes as the Other, as represented in some great literature for children. 
Religious education is merely a specific field in which the problem of the Other 
emerges in remarkable form. 
I agree with almost all the points Strhan suggests, except the evaluation of the 
practice in her school. Indeed, as she pointed out, it is inadequate for religious 
education to address religious issues merely as a matter of knowledge, as long as it is 
connected closely with the problem of the Other, i.e., the opacity and the otherness of 
religious traditions. Nevertheless, I have some questions on two different levels, 
particularly in reference to the last part of Strhan's presentation. 
Question on a Practical Level 
The first question concerns Strhan's practice in her school: the invitation program that 
is distinguished from current models of religious education, and which is represented 
as an example of an improved model. How is it possible to plan engagements with 
those of different religious traditions as a valuable opportunity without spoiling the 
opacity and illeity of the Other? 
In the last part of her presentation, Strhan suggests, referring to the OFSTED 
report, that 'students need to meet those with different viewpoints, to engage with 
them in a dialogue of openness to work together for community cohesion'. According 
to her explanation, the invitation program in her school provided her students with 'a 
valuable opportunity to meet and engage with those from a very different 
background' and 'an invaluable insight into what it might be like to live as a teenager 
whose religious identity is very important to them'. Viewed superficially, the 
'invaluable insight' cited by Strhan seems to resemble the 'empathetic understanding' 
emphasized in the phenomenological model. However, the insight provided by the 
invitation program must include an awareness of the opacity and the otherness of 
different religious traditions. Furthermore, the insight must be distinct from the 
emphasis on rational evaluation of religious truth claims within the critical realist 
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model: the insight should come not only from the intellect but also from the emotions 
and feelings of students. 
Although this invitation program appears to be opposed to the two recent models 
of religious education, it is not clear that this approach is completely free from the 
problems in current religious education that Strhan has indicated. It remains obscure 
what it means in religious education to be aware of the opacity and the otherness of 
religions. Indeed the students might have recognized that religious insights cannot be 
reduced to mere rational evaluation and justification of different religious traditions. 
However, what follows when someone has acquired recognition of the opacity of the 
Other remains unexplained. Strhan gives only a brief suggestion that the students need 
such an opportunity 'to work' together with those who are from different religious 
traditions 'for community cohesion'. Therefore, the suspicion remains that Strhan's 
practice shares some problems, at least partly, with recent models of religious 
education. 
In the invitation program, for example, the opacity of the Other is spoiled to some 
degree because the engagement with those from different religious traditions is 
regarded as a means to work together for community cohesion. This is simply 
represented by the use of the words 'need' and 'to'. Moreover, as long as the 
engagement is considered a 'valuable opportunity' for Strhan's students, we can guess 
that it was assumed to be valuable for the students from the Muslim school likewise. 
This implies 'reciprocity' in interfaith dialogue that is refused by 'the illeity' of the 
Other. The concept of the reciprocity is easily connected with 'the myth of the 
equality of religions' that is denied in the critical realist model. With regard to these 
points, Strhan's practice still remains within the limits of current models of religious 
education. The salient difficulty here is that the opacity of different religions is fixed 
as 'opacity' and represented in language and knowledge just as unknowableness. 
There is no doubt that we know that something given is unknowable: for instance, the 
last number of repeating decimals, whether or not a man called Socrates truly existed 
in ancient Greek, or who invented the word 'unknowable' first in the history of 
human beings. When the opacity of religions is fixed as the opacity in knowledge, 
'the illeity', which is introduced by Strhan positively, is deprived of its distance. 
Consequently, my question is: How is it possible to plan opportunities for 
engagement with those from different religious traditions as a valuable opportunity 
without spoiling the opacity and illeity of the Other? Both planning and evaluation 
invariably foreclose the possibility of such an experience of the Other, although these 
concepts are always located in the centre of the curriculum construction. The 
experience of the Other is invaluable. The fixed standards and foundations needed for 
evaluation and justification are extraneous to the experience itself. 
Question on a Theoretical Level 
As described above, the first question is closely related to curriculum construction in 
schools. It can be integrated into a more extensive inquiry: how is it possible to 
construct a curriculum in religious education based on Strhan's suggestions? In my 
opinion, we can never regard the opacity of the Other in the mode of thinking that 
operates within curriculum construction today, in which the concepts of planning, 
thematizing, and evaluation are central. It is inadequate to introduce key ideas from 
Levinas and Zizek into the field of education because they cannot easily be 
accommodated within the methods of curriculum construction. We must therefore 
devote attention not only to what Levinas and Zizek say, but also to the mode in 
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which they reflect and describe their thoughts, in order to reconsider the methodology 
of curriculum construction itself. 
The second question that demands a response is, however, more straightforward: 
how would it be possible for Strhan to convince her colleagues to follow her 
suggestions about religious education? The purpose of her presentation is to 'consider 
how it might be possible to articulate the nature of what it is to be religious otherwise'. 
She has attempted to indicate that the two recent models of religious education have 
limits, and that another model is to be investigated based on the works of Levinas and 
Zizek. Nevertheless, as she herself remarks repeatedly in her presentation, religious 
beliefs cannot be reduced to knowledge that 'can be argued for and justified'. Strhan 
has pointed out the problem of the critical realist model, which regards 'religious and 
ethical truths as matters open to straightforward evaluation and justification'. 
Furthermore, she mentions that current models of religious education, 'assessing 
student's ability to present a reasoned and justified evaluation of religion, are then 
missing the point'. In spite of this, if she wishes to change the curriculum of current 
religious education, Strhan can do nothing but argue for and justify her suggestions 
because current religious education is based on the ability of rational arguments over 
religious truths. Those people who have received current religious education and have 
been good students in critical realist model can be compared with 'fundamentalists' 
for whom groundless decisions that cannot be based on chains of reasoning and 
positive knowledge are 'unthinkable'. It would appear, therefore, that Strhan can 
never make teachers follow her own belief about 'what it is to be religious otherwise' . 
Indeed my argument might seem too speculative and extreme. It is possible that she 
might succeed in convincing her colleagues of her suggestions. However, when she 
has succeeded in convincing her colleagues with mere arguments such as those 
introduced in her presentation today, she is likely still to be using the conceptual tools 
of the critical realist model. 
Now we are confronted with 'the aporia of the Other': If we try to manifest and 
protect the dignity of the Other for curriculum construction through evaluation and 
justification of its opacity and illeity, we cannot avoid spoiling the dignity of the 
Other itself, despite and because of our positive intention itself. This paradoxical 
situation notwithstanding, I am not wishing to suggest that realizing the type of 
religious education suggested by Strhan is hopeless. The fact that she retains her own 
beliefs on religious issues indicates the possibility of religious education otherwise. 
When and why she started to believe that current religious education 'misses the 
point' is a subject that invites further reflection, although it remains unclear what kind 
of religious education she received. If she has been convinced to adopt her belief 
through rational argument and justification by Levinas, Zizek, or someone else, there 
is no hope of going beyond the critical realist model. If not, however, the manner in 
which she acquired her belief is itself a hint for religious education otherwise. When 
and why has Strhan started to believe that 'belief is ethical to its core' and 'cannot be 
reduced to or justified in terms of knowledge'? This stands as my final question. I 
wish to believe that it represents a hopeful future for religious education otherwise. 
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